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WASBUSHv. GORE A HUMAN 
RIGHTS CASE? 
Gerald L. Neuman* 
Nicholas Hatzis** 
In a contested election, the state's highest court unexpect-
edly concludes, in light of the principles of its own constitution, 
that the officially certified result should be set aside and recalcu-
lated because it employed a restrictive method that impaired the 
counting of every vote. The initial winner moves the case to an 
even higher authority, which rules that the state court's decision 
itself violated the electorate's right to vote. It expresses concern 
that the state court violated equality by creating a situation in 
which votes are counted by different rules in different subjuris-
dictions of the state. 
Sounds familiar? But this time the context was not the mil-
lennia! presidential election in the United States. It was the 
Greek parliamentary election of 2004. and the second decision 
was a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, finding 
that Greece's highest court had violated the international human 
rights of the disappointed candidates. The judgment in Pas-
chalidis v. Greece1 affords a number of interesting perspectives 
on Bush v. Gore,2 and on the brave new world of transnational 
adjudication of election disputes. 
1. WHAT HAPPENED IN ATHENS 
The 2004 parliamentary election in Greece resulted in an 
important shift from a government of the left to a government of 
the right. After eleven years of rule, the Pan Hellenic Socialistic 
Movement (PASOK) lost power to the New Democracy party 
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1. Paschalidis. Koutmeridis and Zaharakis v. Greece. App. Nos. 27863/05 et al. 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 10. 2008) (Judgment). 
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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(ND ). led by Kostas Karamanlis, the nephew of party founder 
and former President Konstantinos Karamanlis.' ND won a solid 
majority, and the electoral litigation was not crucial to making 
Karamanlis Prime Minister-in that respect, there was no simi-
larity to the U.S. election of 2000. 
Greece elects its parliament through a complicated scheme 
of proportional representation.4 The system seeks stability by 
awarding a premium of seats to the plurality party, and it also re-
inforces the strength of small parties that exceed the minimum 
threshold. For the 2004 election, allocation of seats to candidates 
on party lists proceeded in three stages. At the first stage, seats 
were distributed within multimember electoral districts by calcu-
lating an "electoral quotient'' equal to the total number of votes 
divided by the number of seats for the district plus one. At this 
stage, each party received as many seats as the integral number 
of times its own vote score exceeded the electoral quotient. 
(Thus, if the electoral quotient were 20,000, and the party won 
45,000 votes, it would receive two seats at this stage.) At the next 
stage, seats not yet allocated would be distributed based on vote 
scores within a larger region. 
The Paschalidis litigation concerned three parliamentary 
seats won in districts in the region of Central Macedonia. The 
reelection of P ASOK deputy Giorgos Paschalidis in the district 
of Pella was challenged by losing ND candidate Parthena Foun-
toukidou before the Supreme Special Court (SSC), the compe-
tent court for parliamentary election disputes.; She questioned 
the validity of some individual ballots, but more importantly she 
claimed that the electoral quotient for Pella was wrongly calcu-
3. Both nephew and namesake. because "Kostas" is a nickname for "Konstanti-
nos." The uncle (who died in 1998) had been the first Prime Minister and later President 
of the Greek Republic established in 1974 after the fall of the military dictatorship. As 
we will see. another of the current Prime Minister's uncles. Achilleas Karamanlis. was 
also involved in the 2004 electoral saga. Meanwhile. the dynastic resemblance to Bush v. 
Gore is heightened by the fact that PASOK was led in the 2004 elections by Giorgos Pa-
pandreou. son of P ASOK founder Andreas Papandreou. who had served as Prime Minis-
ter from 1981 until 1989 and from 1993 until his death in 1996. Andreas Papandreou's 
immediate successor. Kostas Simitis. did not seek reelection in 2004. 
4. See Prodromos D. Dagtoglou. Constitutional and Administrative Law. in 
INTRODUCTION TO GREEK LAW 23. 34-35 (Konstantinos D. Kerameus & Phaedon J. 
Kozyris eds. 3d ed. 2008). Its features have been repeatedly adjusted by prospective legis-
lation. sometimes for partisan advantage. See Stratos Patrikios & Georgios Karyotis. The 
Greek parliamentary election of 2007. 27 ELECTORAL STUD. 356. 357 (2008): see also G. 
Kazamias and D. Papadimitriou. The elections in Greece, April 2000. 21 ELECTORAL 
STUD. 649.650 (2002) (explaining the three-stage system). 
5. See Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio [AED] [Supreme Special Court] 12/2005 
(Greece) [hereinafter SSC Judgment 12/2005]. 
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lated, because the numerator included only the votes cast for the 
various parties: it failed to add in the blank ballots presumably 
cast as protest votes." As chance would have it, including the 
modest number of blank ballots in the total would raise the elec-
toral quotient for Pella sufficiently that P ASOK would earn only 
one seat rather than two at the first stage of allocation.7 Pas-
chalidis would lose his seat. Fountoukidou would gain hers at the 
second stage, and additional repercussions would follow for 
other candidates in Central Macedonia, including the election to 
Parliament of Achilleas Karamanlis, an uncle of the new Prime 
Minister.~ 
A possible difficulty for Fountoukidou's argument was that 
blank ballots were not normally counted toward the electoral 
quotient. Indeed the presidential decree implementing the elec-
toral statute had been interpreted as excluding them, and the 
SSC had previously held (in a 1999 decision involving European 
Parliament elections) that the Greek Constitution did not re-
quire them to be counted.~ The SSC consists of eleven judges 
drawn from the three highest courts. the Court of Cassation, the 
Council of State, and the Court of Auditors. 10 The composition 
6. Blank ballots in Greece are not regular party ballots left unmarked by the voter. 
but special blank ballots provided by the government. They are unlikely to be cast by 
mistake. 
7. According to the SSCs calculation. 560 blank ballots were cast in Pella. and 
including them raised the electoral quotient (total votes divided by five) from 23.462 to 
23.574. PASOK received only 46.998 votes in Pella. which was more than twice 23.462. 
but less than twice 23.574. Consequently. the SSC's judgment gave PASOK one rather 
than two seats at the first stage. (The precise numbers were also affected by Fountouki-
dou·s challenges to specific ballots. but the resulting slight changes did not form part of 
the debate at the European level.) See SSC Judgment 12/2005. para. 16: Application at 6. 
Giorgos Paschalidis v. Hellenic Republic. App. No. 27863/05 (July 18. 2005) (hereinafter 
Paschalidis Application]. 
8. See SSC Judgment 12/2005. paras. 18-20: Paschalidis Application. supra note 7. 
at 5. (Understandably. the SSC Judgment mentions the name but not the relationship.) 
Two other candidates. Efstathios Koutmeridis of PASOK and Konstantinos Zaharakis of 
ND. also lost their seats as a result. and their claims were decided jointly with that of 
Paschalidis by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). For simplicity. we will 
focus on the case of Paschalidis. 
9. Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio [AED] [Supreme Special Court] 34/1999 (Greece). 
The SSC interpreted the law as making blank ballots an intermediate category between 
valid ballots and invalid ballots: only valid ballots counted toward the electoral quotient. 
See SSC Judgment 12/2005. para. 9. 
10. See 2001 Syntagma (SYN] [Constitution] art. 100 § 2. (Greece). The SSC also 
serves. under a different head of jurisdiction. as the court for authoritative resolution of 
controversies on the constitutionality of statutes. /d. art. 100 § 1(e). Greece follows the 
U.S. system of diffuse judicial review. under which all courts are authorized to rule on the 
constitutionality of laws in cases properly before them. but the decisions of the sse 
under Article 100(1)(e) have exceptional precedential effect. See Dagtoglou. supra note 
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of the SSC panel convened for the hearing of Fountoukidou's 
challenge also engendered dispute; it has been alleged that the 
President of the Court of Auditors improperly removed himself 
from the case in favor a junior Vice President of his Court who 
had been appointed after the election. 11 However that may be, 
the SSC ruled by six votes to five in favor of Fountoukidou's 
challenge. 1" 
The majority of the SSC found the exclusion of blank bal-
lots from the calculation of the electoral quotient to be unconsti-
tutional. It quoted provisions of the Greek constitution declaring 
popular sovereignty as the foundation of government and de-
scribing its exercise in parliamentary elections, and noted the 
corresponding provision of the European human rights conven-
tion. L' The majority emphasized parliamentary elections as the 
most important vehicle of popular sovereignty, and the need for 
equal treatment of all valid ballots. It maintained that the mini-
mum legal effect guaranteed by the Constitution to all valid bal-
lots-whether expressing positive support for a party or inten-
tionally left blank-included counting them toward the electoral 
quotient. Treating the blank ballots merely as a statistic to be re-
ported would reduce them to the equivalent of invalid ballots, 
and would not respect the free expression of the voter's will. The 
legislature had discretion in structuring the electoral system, but 
excluding valid blank ballots from the electoral quotient in par-
liamentary elections struck at the core of the principles of popu-
lar sovereignty and equality in voting and violated the Constitu-
tion. 
4. at 31. 33. For an English language translation of the Constitution. see THE 
CO:"STITUTION OF GREECE: AS REVISED BY THE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION OF 
APRIL 6TH 2001. OF THE VIITH REVISIONARY PARLIAMENT (2004). available al 
www .parliament.gr/english/politeuma/syntagma. pdf. 
11. See Paschalidis Application. supra note 7. at 5. 19. The SSC rejected a challenge 
to the participation of the judge by 8 votes to 3. Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio (AED] (Su-
preme Special Court] 8/2005 (Greece). Paschalidis claimed in Strasbourg that he had 
been denied an impartial tribunal by manipulation of the courfs composition. in viola-
tion of ECHR Article 6(1 ). but the European Court held (consistent with its precedents) 
that Article 6(1) did not apply to the resolution of contested elections. Paschalidis. 
Koutmeridis & Zaharakis v. Greece. App. Nos. 27863/05 et al. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006) (par-
tial decision on admissibility): cf. Cheminade v. France. 1999-Il Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 
31599/96 (decision on admissibility) (stating that proceedings to resolve electoral disputes 
lie outside scope of Article 6(1)). 
12. The disputed Vice President was among the six: the SSC judgment identifies the 
five dissenters. See SSC Judgment 12/2005. para. 10. 
13. /d. para. 10 (quoting 2001 Syntagma (SYN] (Constitution] art. 1 §§ 2. 3: art. 5 
§ 1. art. 51 § 3: art. 52 (Greece) (citing Article 3 of Protocol 1. infra note 18). 
2008] BUSH v. GORE A HUMAN RIGHTS CASE? 219 
The SSC judgment also set forth the dissenting view of five 
judges, and the particular view of one of them. 1 ~ The five argued 
that, although the Constitution implicitly guaranteed the right to 
cast blank ballots, the legislature could legitimately differentiate 
between the effects of ballots choosing a party and ballots ex-
pressing no choice, in relation to the current system of represen-
tation. In addition, one dissenter wrote separately that the Con-
stitution favored stability in electoral law.1' that the present 
decision departed without justification from the SSC's 1999 deci-
sion, and that the legislation sufficiently respected the free will 
of the voters by enabling them to cast a blank ballot and have it 
tabulated and reported. (The majority opinion did not expressly 
respond to the claim of inconsistency with its own precedent. 1") 
Under the Greek Constitution. the SSC is the final judge of 
electoral disputes. 17 Thus, Fountoukidou prevailed and took her 
seat in Parliament. But that was not the end of the story, because 
Paschalidis sued Greece before the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg. He argued that the deprivation of his seat 
violated the European Human Rights Convention. 
2. WHAT HAPPENED IN STRASBOURG 
Paschalidis challenged the SSC's decision under the free 
elections provision of the European human rights system, Arti-
cle 3 of Protocol No. 1. 1 ~ That provision guarantees "free elec-
tions ... under conditions which will ensure the free expression 
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." The 
14. !d. para. 10. (The views of the dissenting judges are appended to the same 
lengthy paragraph that set forth the argument of the majority.). 
15. An amendment to the Greek Constitution in 2001 provided that legislative 
changes in electoral law would not apply until after an intervening election. unless par-
liament voted by 2/3 majority to give them immediate effect. See 2001 Syntagma [SYN] 
[Constitution] art. 54 § 1 (Greece). This amendment decreases the abilitv of an incum-
bent majority to fine-tune the system in anticipation of imminent electi.ons. See supra 
note 4. 
16. Speculatively. one might attempt to reconcile the two decisions by distinguish-
ing European elections from national parliamentary elections. which the majority had 
emphasized as central to the constitutional conception of popular sovereignty. But the 
majority did not expressly offer this reconciliation. and the Greek gmernment did not 
later argue it to the ECtHR. 
17. See 2001 Syntagma [SYNJ [Constitution] arts. 5R. 100 § l(a) (Greece). 
18. Protocol No. 1. Mar. 20. 1952. E.T.S. 9. 213 U.l\.T.S. 262. adjoined additional 
rights to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms. Nov. 4. 1950. E.T.S. 5. 213 U.N.T.S. 222. Article 3 prmides: "The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals bv secret bal· 
lot. under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature ... 
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has long construed 
it as protecting the individual's right to vote, the individual's 
right to stand as candidate, and the right of elected candidates to 
exercise their legislative offices. 
A chamber of the ECtHR gave judgment in April 2008, 
holding unanimously that Greece had violated Article 3. 19 The 
ECtHR had no objection to the counting of blank ballots per se. 
Article 3 leaves the European states considerable discretion (a 
wide "margin of appreciation'') to structure their electoral sys-
tems, adapting them to their own visions of democracy. Limita-
tions on electoral rights must serve legitimate goals, and must 
not be disproportionate to those ends. Including blank ballots in 
the electoral quotient, and viewing that inclusion as required by 
principles of popular sovereignty or electoral equality, fell within 
the state's proper discretion. 
But the ECtHR objected to the SSC's changing the rules in 
the midst of the election. Once the choice of the people has been 
freely expressed, retroactive changes in the system should not 
nullify that choice. unless grounds of pressing significance to the 
democratic order require it. The SSC's revision of Greek consti-
tutional doctrine. invalidating the laws then in force, was unfore-
seeable by the voters and the candidates. It changed the meaning 
of the casting of blank ballots from a disavowal of the political 
parties to a vote in their favor. The Greek government had not 
put forward any special justification for this change. (It had de-
fended the merit of the new interpretation, and argued that the 
ECtHR should not obstruct progressive development of consti-
tutional doctrine.'") Moreover, applying the new constitutional 
19. The mills of justice grind slowly in Strasbourg. because the ECtHR is overbur-
dened with thousands of cases. Paschalidis filed his application in July 2005: the ECtHR 
issued an initial admissibility decision in October 2006. a further admissibility decision in 
September 2007. and its judgment on the merits on AprillO. 2008. 
The ECtHR does have a procedure for accelerating its consideration of cases by giv-
ing them "priority ... See EUR. CT. H.R .. RULES OF COURT. Rule 41 (2007). The ECtHR 
did not employ this procedure in Paschalidis or in any of the previous voting rights cases 
cited elsewhere in this Article. While this Article was in press. however. the ECtHR did 
decide one voting rights case as a matter of priority. Tanase and Chirtoaca v. Moldova. 
App. No. 7/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 18. 2008) (finding that a 2008 statute banning office-
holding by dual nationals violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1). After the Council of 
Europe's Commission against Racism and Intolerance and a committee of the Parlia-
mentarv Assemblv of the Council of Europe had criticized the new restriction, the 
ECtHR gave it piiority in order to reach a decision in advance of the 2009 legislative 
elections. See id. paras. 4. 35-37. 
20. See Observations of the Greek Government on the Applications at 16-17. Pas-
chalidis. Koutmeridis & Zaharakis v. Greece. App. Nos. 27863/05, 28422/05 & 28028/05. 
(2007). 
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rule only in the region of Central Macedonia created an inequal-
ity between voters in different parts of Greece, inconsistent with 
the principle of equal treatment implied in Article 3. 
The ECtHR also considered it significant that the Greek 
parliament had enacted a new electoral statute in 2006 that re-
jected the counting of blank ballots toward the electoral quo-
tient. This factor underlined the uniqueness of the SSC's deci-
• 21 
SlOn. 
Accordingly, the ECtHR concluded that Greece had vio-
lated the rights of Paschalidis under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, 
and ordered Greece to compensate him for his loss of income 
during the parliamentary term- which had already ended. 
3. COMPARISONS, AT TWO LEVELS 
Neither Paschalidis nor the ECtHR cited Bush v. Gore, and 
the comparison might be unwelcome in Europe. But does Pas-
chalidis shed a retrospective favorable light on the U.S. Supreme 
Court's intervention in the 2000 election? 
The Florida Supreme Court, it will be recalled, had con-
strued Florida election laws in light of a perceived mandate of 
the state constitution to "safeguard the right of each voter to ex-
press his or her will in the context of our representative democ-
racy."22 After the United States Supreme Court expressed uncer-
tainty about the role the state constitution played in the decision, 
21. At first glance. this observation is puzzling. because the 2006 statute may simply 
be unconstitutional. as the SSC's decision implies. See id. at 19. A holding to that effect 
would not be unforeseeable. but none has yet occurred. The 2006 law was applied with-
out challenge in the 2007 parliamentary election. Meanwhile. a challenge on a slightly 
different issue. the failure to count blank ballots in determining the percentage of the 
vote required to avoid a run-off in mayoral elections. is pending before the Greek Coun-
cil of State. A chamber of the Council of State upheld the exclusion of blank ballots as 
within the legislature's discretion: one dissenter argued that the exclusion violated the 
constitutional principles of popular sovereignty and voter equality as articulated by the 
SSC: and the case has been referred to the Plenarv Session of the Council of State. See 
Symboulion Epikrateias [SE] [Supreme Administ;ative Court] 117/2008 (Third Cham-
ber. Council of State. Greece). 
22. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris. 772 So. 2d 1220. 1237 (Fla. 2000). 
vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd .. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). The 
Florida court began its discussion by quoting article 1. section 1 of the Florida Constitu-
tion: "'All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain 
rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people.·· /d. at 
1236. Compare 2001 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] art. I. ~§ 2. 3 (Greece). quoted by 
the sse at the outset of its analvsis: 
2. Popular sovereignty is the foundation of government. 
3. All powers derive from the People and exist for the People and the Nation: 
they shall be exercised as specified by the Constitution. 
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and the possible incompatibility of such a role with the U.S. 
Constitution's assignment of authority over the choice of Presi-
dential electors to the state legislatures, the Florida Supreme 
Court revised its approach to emphasize protection of voters' 
rights as a statutory policy.23 The U.S. Supreme Court then 
stayed the recount on December 9,24 and ordered it permanently 
halted on December 12.25 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, 
and Justice Thomas concluded that the Florida Supreme Court 
had "impermissibly distorted" the Florida election laws, chang-
ing them from ''the law of the State as it existed prior to the ac-
tion of the court,'' and had usurped the power "to step away 
from [the] established practice [and] to depart from the legisla-
tive scheme. "26 The per curiam opinion that received majority 
support did not make this interpretive argument central to its 
decision on the merits, but found a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in the Florida Supreme Court's method of ordering a 
recount, allowing the local bodies implementing its order to ap-
ply nonuniform standards for determining the validity of ballots1 
including those that contained the famous "dimpled chad."2' 
With regard to the remedy, both components of the majority re-
jected the Florida Supreme Court's zeal to continue counting 
votes, ~ind.ing that it had improperly int~~preted the state law's 
authonzatiOn of an "appropnate remedy. -
Through the lens of Paschalidis, one can imagine how an in-
ternational human rights tribunal might have condemned the 
Florida Supreme Court's actions. Rather than vindicating the 
Florida electorate's right to vote,2y the Florida court's unforesee-
able revision of past practices might be seen as changing the ef-
fect of the ballots already cast, diluting the strength of the vote 
of citizens who had scrupulously followed the official instruc-
tions."' Variations in the methods of counting the ballots might 
n. See Gore v. Harris. 772 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). m·'d sub nom. Bush v. Gore. 531 
U.S. 98 (2000): Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris. 772 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). 
24. Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). 
25. Bush\. Gore. 531 U.S. 98. 110 (2000). 
26. /d. at 114-15. 120 (Rehnquist. C.J.. concurring). 
27. !d. at 105-09 (per curiam). 
28. /d. at 110-11: id. at 121-22 (Rehnquist. C.J .. concurring). 
29. See, e.g.. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. art. 25. Mar. 23. 
1976 ("Everv citizen shall have the right ... without unreasonable restrictions ... (b) To 
vote ... at g~nuine periodic elections which shall be held by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret ballot. guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the elec-
tors ...... ). The United States ratified the Covenant in 1992. 
30. The reliance interests affected bv this change were arguably weaker than the 
reliance interests in Paschalidis. where the ·voters who cast blank ballots probably did not 
intend to confer an advantage on one party over another. On the other hand. conceivably 
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also be seen as creating inequalities between voters in different 
counties. Recognizing the Florida court's interpretation of state 
law as a revision could require the international tribunal to form 
its own judgment about the meaning of domestic law, but it is 
not uncommon for international tribunals in human rights cases 
to examine domestic officials' interpretation of domestic law 
(perhaps deferentially), in order to determine whether they have 
a legal basis or whether they are unfairly retroactive, or whether 
they are not sufficiently definite to avoid arbitrary application." 
The remedy ordered for the human rights violation in Pas-
chalidis differed from the remedy for which Bush v. Gore is fa-
mous. The ECtHR declared that the Convention had been vio-
lated (regarding this vindication as itself a remedy for 
Paschalidis), and ordered payment of lost earnings and costs. 
But it did not give Paschalidis his seat in parliament. In part, that 
resulted from the passage of time: processing the case in Stras-
bourg took almost three years, and by the time the ECtHR ren-
dered judgment, new elections had been held.32 In part, that re-
sults from the remedial caution of the ECtHR, which has slowly 
expanded its understanding of its authority to order performance 
of actions (such as release of prisoners) instead of payment of 
compensation. Moreover, Paschalidis did not request a prelimi-
nary injunction (known in the European human rights system as 
"interim measures"31 ) to avoid irreparable harm pending the 
ECtHR's decision. The ECtHR has been relatively sparing so far 
in its use of interim measures, though some human rights tribu-
nals have been more expansive.34 If the U.S. Supreme Court 
some Florida voters deliberately cast paper ballots that expressed no preference among 
the presidential candidates. but on which election officials could imagine a dimpled chad. 
31. See, e.g.. Maestri v. Italy. 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 39748/98 (Grand 
Chamber) (finding that Italian law did not provide sufficient notice that membership in a 
Masonic lodge would result in disciplinary sanctions): Jahn v. Germany. 2005-VI Eur. Ct. 
H.R .. App. Nos. 46720/99 et. a! (Grand Chamber) (concluding that first statute left 
claimants' property rights uncertain. and that subsequent corrective statute did not un-
fairly deprive them of property): Achour v. France. 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 
67335/01 (Grand Chamber) (finding that application of amended recidivism laws to sub-
sequent offense was foreseeable and did not violate prohibition on retroactive criminal 
laws): P.G. v. United Kingdom. 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 44787/98 (finding that 
British law provided insufficient legal basis for covert recording. even inside police sta-
tions). 
32. See Patrikios & Karyotis. supra note 4. at 356 (discussing Greek parliamentary 
election of September 2007). 
33. See Mamatkulov v. Turkey. 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. Nos. 46827/99 et a!. 
(Grand Chamber). In that case. the ECtHR reviewed the practice of international tribu-
nals regarding variously named remedial orders pendente lite, and changed its jurispru-
dence to hold that interim measures are binding. 
34. See The "'La Naci6n"' Case. Provisional Measures (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Sept. 7. 
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could find that staying the Florida recount was necessary to 
avoid irreparable harm, then someday an international tribunal 
might also find interim measures appropriate in an election 
" case. 
Alternatively, one could look at Bush v. Gore itself through 
the same lens. From the international human rights perspective, 
the U.S. Supreme Court's unprecedented intervention in the 
presidential election might also be seen as violating the right to 
vote. The majority's interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause was unforeseeable, and has not been applied to later 
elections. The concurrence's application of Article II was also 
novel. The majority's remedial rulings were an astonishing de-
parture from prior practice in resolving disputed presidential 
elections. As Paschalidis illustrates, the fact that a national su-
preme court is construing the nation's own constitution in taking 
control of an election does not formally immunize the decision 
from international human rights scrutiny. Thus, the perspective 
Paschalidis affords on the resolution of the 2000 U.S. election is 
equivocal-it lends support to both sides. 
For those who regard the Supreme Court's decision in Bush 
v. Gore as rescuing the nation from the "train wreck" that the 
constitutionally specified procedures for resolving disputed 
presidential elections would have produced,'" the Paschalidis de-
cision may have articulated the relevant defense. Grounds of 
pressing significance to the democratic order could justify a 
court in revising its doctrine in the midst of an election chal-
lenge. In European human rights law, the right to vote is not ab-
solute, and constitutional provisions are not sacrosanct when 
2001). available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/lanacion_se_04_ing.pdf (order-
ing suspension of enforcement of libel judgment against journalist). 
It is not clear how Greece would have responded if the ECtHR had ordered that 
Paschalidis be restored to office. In the Greek legal system. treaties are hierarchically 
superior to statute but inferior to the Constitution. 2001 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] 
art. 28 (Greece); Dagtoglou. supra note 4. at 25. Greece can pay compensation to Pas-
chalidis without violating its Constitution. but compliance with a restoration order might 
have required either a constitutional amendment or a voluntary revision of interpretation 
bv the sse. 
· 35. See Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 1046. 1047 (2000) (Scalia. J .. concurring) (justifying 
the stay order); cf Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections. 422 F.3d 77. 96-98 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (affirming preliminary injunction against certifying election outcome without 
counting absentee ballots): Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873. 886-87 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirm-
ing preliminary injunction unseating candidate who allegedly won by fraud. but reversing 
preliminary injunction seating his opponent). 
36. See. e.g .. Richard A. Posner. Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the 
Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation. 2000 SUP. Cf. REV. 1. 49-50 (2001). 
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they themselves violate human rights. Again, opinions differ on 
whether the Supreme Court avoided a disaster. 
Of course, one might also hold Paschalidis to a mirror, and 
ask how foreseeable the ECtHR's decision was.37 The ECtHR 
had not decided a case of this kind as of 2004-2005, when the 
relevant acts occurred. The ECtHR had decided cases about the 
disenfranchisement of classes of voters,'' about discriminatory 
electoral structures,39 about membership in banned political par-
ties,40 and fact-specific cases about disqualification of candi-
dates!1 In 2006, while Paschalidis was pending in Strasbourg, the 
ECtHR condemned the SSC's retroactive application of a consti-
tutional amendment in Greece to remove a sitting member of 
Parliament.42 Thus, there were elements that would support a 
37. Foreseeable or not. the decision has not been controversial. In part that may be 
because the delayed decision had no direct consequences for the composition of the leg-
islature: moreover. the panel of European judges (unlike the SSC panel) was not sus-
pected of having partisan interest in the outcome of a contest between two mainstream 
democratic parties in Greece. The basic principle of regional adjudication of human 
rights disputes is also well-established in Greece. 
38. See Labita v. Italy. 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 26772/95 (Grand Chamber) 
(disenfranchisement of suspected Mafioso despite acquittal violated Article 3 of Protocol 
1): see also Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2). 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 74025/01 
(Grand Chamber) (disproportionately broad disenfranchisement of imprisoned criminals 
violated Article 3 of Protocol 1. affirming March 2004 Chamber decision): Campagnano 
v. Italy. 2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No.77955/01 (disenfranchisement due to bankruptcy 
violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 ). 
39. See Matthews v. United Kingdom. 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 24833/94 
(Grand Chamber) (exclusion of Gibraltar residents from European Parliament elections 
violated Article 3 of Protocol 1): Aziz v. Cyprus. 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 
69949/01 (Second Section) (disenfranchisement of Turkish Cypriots violated Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 ). 
40. See Selim Sadak v. Turkey. 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. Nos. 25144/94 et a!. 
(dismissal from parliament of member of banned party was disproportionate and vio-
lated Article 3 of Protocol1). The ECtHR has tended to decide cases directly challenging 
the prohibition of a party under the rubric of freedom of association rather than electoral 
rights. See United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey. 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. No. 
19392/92 (Grand Chamber) (premature dissolution of party violated Article 11): Refah 
Partisi v. Turkey. 2003-11 Eur. Ct. H.R .. App. Nos. 41340/98 eta!. (Grand Chamber) (up-
holding dissolution of Islamist party). 
41. See Podkolzina v. Latvia. 2002-11 Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 46726/99 (arbitrary 
disqualification of candidate for insufficient fluency in Latvian): Melnychenko v. 
Ukraine. 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 17707/02 (finding arbitrary disqualification of 
candidate due to temporary refuge abroad). The ECtHR has also rejected certain chal-
lenges to minimum percentage thresholds for inclusion of political parties in legislatures 
based on proportional representation: a case of that kind was pending before the Grand 
Chamber at the time of the Paschalidis decision. 
42. Lykourezos v. Greece. 2006-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R.. App. No. 33554/03. In that de-
cision. mentioned prominently in both Paschalidis's written submission and the judg-
ment. the ECtHR had found improper the application of a 2001 constitutional amend-
ment. which forbade members of parliament to practice. to an attornev elected in 2000. 
even with regard to professional activity in 2003. · 
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further extension of the case law, but nothing on point before 
2008. 
The ECtHR did censure another vote counting decision two 
months earlier. in Kovach v. Ukraine.43 In that case, a different 
chamber of the court found that a local electoral commission had 
acted arbitrarily in violation of Article 3 by discarding all the 
votes in four wards after reports of minor irregularities.44 The 
Ukrainian courts had held that the local electoral commission 
had exclusive authority to decide what circumstances justified 
disregarding all the votes in an electoral division, and the 
ECtHR criticized the commission for failing to explain why the 
very low numbers of alleged irregularities required so dispropor-
tionate a sanction, which had conveniently reversed the out-
4:'i 
come. 
The closeness of the ECtHR's examination of elections ap-
pears to be increasing. At the same time, the remedial conse-
quences of its fact-specific decisions have often been limited. In 
most of these cases, as in Paschalidis, the ECtHR has found a 
violation after the term in question has already expired, and or-
ders compensation on grounds that will not be exactly repeated. 
Its voting rights decisions have greater prospective effect when 
they invalidate disenfranchisement rules, or discriminatory elec-
toral structures. 
The other active international human rights court, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which is less in-
hibited about remedies.-~~> issued a decision with broad prospec-
tive implications in its Y AT AMA case of 2005.47 The IACtHR 
found that the right to political participation under the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights guaranteed the right of can-
didates to run without belonging to a political party, and the 
right of organizations to field candidates without structuring 
themselves as a political party, if that structure was inappropri-
ate to their needs . .m It ordered Nicaragua to adapt its electoral 
laws to the organizational needs of indigenous and ethnic minor-
43. Kovach v. Ukraine. App. No. 39424/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7. 2008). This 
roughly contemporaneous decision was not cited in Paschalidis. 
44. /d. para. 61. 
45. /d. para. 60. 
46. See Gerald L. Neuman. Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. 19 EUR. J. IN'TL L. 101. 104-05 (2008) (discussing the 
remedial activism of the !ACt HR. and its difficulties in inducing compliance). 
47. Case of Y AT AMA v. Nicaragua. 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127 (Ju-
ne 23. 2005). 
48. /d. paras. 215-20. 
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ity communities. The IACtHR also held that the provisions of 
the Nicaraguan constitution that established the Supreme Elec-
toral Council as an independent fourth branch of government 
whose decisions on elections were not subject to judicial review 
violated the right to judicial protection under the American 
Convention, and ordered Nicaragua to make provision for such 
review.49 Nicaragua has not rejected this decision. but three years 
later it was only in early stages of deliberation on implementing 
the ordered reforms, including changes to its constitution, and 
had not yet paid the damages awarded by the court.'0 
The United States is not a party to the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, and has not accepted the jurisdiction of 
an international court to adjudicate claims of human rights viola-
tions brought against it, in electoral disputes or otherwise. Other 
democracies have joined regional systems of binding human 
rights adjudication. National courts in such regimes have seen 
their creativity flanked by new forms of accountability that they 
cannot silence by claiming the mantle of constitutional authority. 
Their experience in voting rights cases, as in other fields, is re-
vealing once more that supreme courts of any system are infalli-
ble only to the extent that they are final, in time and in space. 
49. /d. paras. 170-76. 
50. See Case of Y AT AMA v. Nicaragua. Supervision of Compliance \\ith Judgment (Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. Aug. 4. 2008). available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/ 
yatama_04_08_08_ing.pdf. 
